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Shaky Ground
William Simkulet

The debate surrounding free will and moral responsibility is one of the
most intransigent debates in contemporary philosophy - but it does not
have to be. At its heart, the free will debate is a metaethical debate - a
debate about the meaning of certain moral terms - free will, moral
responsibility, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness. Compatibilists argue
that these concepts are compatible with wholly deterministic world,
while incompatibilists argue that these concepts require indeterminism,
or multiple possible futures. However, compatibilists and
incompatibilists do not disagree on everything - both parties agree that
free will and moral responsibility require control - the kind of control
that we believe we have over the majority of our everyday actions. Over
the course of any given day each of us makes countless choices, and in
most situations as we make these choices we cannot help but believe that
we are in control of them - that our actions are free and we are morally
responsible for them. Here I argue that our concepts of free will and
moral responsibility are inexorably tied to this experience of apparent
liberty.

Introduction
Susan opens her refrigerator looking for a midnight snack and spots a batch of Christmas
cookies that her sister, Mary, had cooked the day before explicitly exclusively for their
Christmas party the following day. Susan likes cookies. It occurs to her that she can do one
of two things - either take a cookie, or not take a cookie.
Over the course of any given day each of us are confronted with countless situations like
the one described above - situations in which it appears to us as if we have multiple
possible options and that we are free to choose amongst them. The vast majority of
choices we make are such that - at least as we make them - we cannot help but believe
that our choices are entirely up to us, that we are the determining factor between two or
more possible series of events, that we could choose to initiate any of these series of
events, and that we can choose to act for reasons - or without regard to reasons at all. To
choose in this manner is to act freely, or to exercise one’s free will. Furthermore, we cannot
help but believe that we are truly morally responsible for these choices (such that it would
be appropriate to praise or blame us for these actions) because we believe that we are the
authors of these choices.
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One of the most seemingly intractable debates in philosophy - the free will debate
- is a metaethical debate, or a debate about the meaning of moral terms - in this case free
will and moral responsibility.1 A satisfactory metaethical theory is a theory that defines
terms in a manner consistent with how we actually use them, and it is in situations like
that described above in which we are likely to describe ourselves as exercising our free
will and being morally responsible as a result.
The major point of contention in the free will debate is about whether or not our
concepts of free will and moral responsibility are compatible with the theory of universal
causal determinism, where universal causal determinism is the theory that the actual past,
coupled with the laws of nature, determine the future. If determinism is true, at any
given time there is only one possible future - the actual future. Compatibilists contend that
free will and moral responsibility are compatible with universal causal determinism,
while incompatibilists contend that free will and moral responsibility are not.2 Both sides

It is important to distinguish between an agent being morally responsible from our being morally
justified in judging an agent to be morally responsible. It is generally accepted that one’s moral
responsibility for their actions depends in no small part on the intentions and beliefs one had when
acting. Indeed, we're very likely to revise our judgments of moral responsibility when we learn
more about the agent’s beliefs, intentions, or ability to do otherwise. For example, see William
Simkulet, ‘On Moral Enhancement’, American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3:4 (2012), pp. 17-18,
and ‘In Control’, Philosophical Inquires 2:1 (2014), pp. 59-75. The metaethical inquiry in this paper
will focus on moral responsibility, and not judgments of moral responsibility.
2 Semicompatibilists, like John Martin Fischer, contend that while moral responsibility is compatible
with determinism, free will is not. See John Martin Fischer, ‘Responsibility and Control’, Journal of
Philosophy 79 (1982), pp. 24-40; John Martin Fischer, ‘As Go the Frankfurt Examples, so Goes
Deontic Morality’, Journal of Ethics 4 (2000), pp. 361-363; John Martin Fischer, ‘The Importance of
Frankfurt-Style Argument’, Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2007a), pp. 464-471; John Martin Fischer,
Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, Four Views on Free Will (Walden, MA: Blackwell
Publishing, 2007); John Martin Fischer, ‘The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories’, Philosophical
Review 119 (2010), pp. 315-336. However, insofar as most of us would likely revise our judgments of
moral responsibility when we discover an agent lacks free will, this view is substantially at odds
with how we actually use moral terminology (see Simkulet ‘On Moral Enhancement’ and ‘In
Control’). Revisionsists argue that we ought to revise our concepts of free will and moral
responsibility, usually so that they fit in with our now, largely deterministic scientific view of the
world. See Vargas 2007. Because this paper is interested in metaethics, revisionism is outside the
scope of this paper. For compatibilist theories, see Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free
Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984); Harry G. Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities
and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy 66:23 (1969), pp. 829-839; Harry G. Frankfurt,
‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), pp. 5-20; Harry G.
Frankfurt, ‘Some Thoughts Concerning PAP’, in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities
Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, edited by David Widerker and Michael McKenna
(Aldershot: Ashgate, [2003] 2006), pp. 339-345; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by
L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edition, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1739-1740]
1975); David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd
edition, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1751] 1975); David Hunt, ‘Moral
Responsibility and Unavoidable Action’, Philosophical Studies 97 (2000), pp. 195–227; David Hunt,
‘Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005), pp. 126–
145; Peter F. Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of the British Academy XLVIII (1962),
pp. 1-25.
1
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in the debate generally accept that moral responsibility requires control of some sort, and
this control comes with free will.
Libertarianism is, roughly, the theory that the experience of apparent liberty
described in the case above are largely veridical and capture a relevant, indeterministic
feature of our decision making process. According to the libertarian, if Susan has free
will, then she doesn’t just believe that she can either take the cookie or not take the
cookie, but that she actually can chose to do either. Libertarians are incompatibilists who
believe that (i) incompatibilism is true - free will and moral responsibility are
incompatible with determinism, (ii) determinism is false, and (iii) free will and moral
responsibility are possible in the actual world.3
Many philosophers believe that experiences like Susan’s are illusory, ‘false
sensation[s]’ of liberty,4 requiring an ‘obscure and panicky metaphysics’.5 Most
compatibilists believe determinism is true at the actual world, and these compatibilists
are committed to the proposition that Susan is, in an important sense, wrong - there are
no alternate possible futures and her choice about whether or not she would take the
cookie was determined long before she was even born.6 None of us, they contend, can do
anything but what we actually do.
The primary way in which analytic philosophers endeavor to discover truth
about concepts like free will and moral responsibility is to see how we employ these
concepts in actual and hypothetical situations.7 This method assumes that the ways in

Libertarians can be contrasted with hard incompatibilists who believe that free will and moral
responsibility are incompatible with either determinism or indeterminism, and hard determinists,
incompatibilists who believe determinism is true and thus free will and moral responsibility are not
possible in the actual world. For an example of hard incompatibilism, see Galen Strawson, ‘The
Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 5-24; Derk Pereboom,
‘Defending Hard Incompatibilism’, Midwest Studies 29 (2005), pp. 228-247; Derk Pereboom,
‘Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again‘, in Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by
Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2008), pp. 1-33.
4 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2.3.2.2.
5 P. F. Strawson, p. 25.
6 Some incompatibilist philosophers, such as Robert Kane, also reject the idea that our experiences
accurately reflect the world. For Kane, free will and moral responsibility require only small,
momentary bouts of indeterminism. See Robert Kane, Free Will and Values (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1985); Robert Kane, ‘Two Kinds of Incompatibilism’, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 50 (1989), pp. 219-254; Robert Kane, ‘Free Will: The Elusive Ideal’,
Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 25-60; Robert Kane, ‘Freedom, Responsibility, and Will-Setting’,
Philosophical Topics 24:2 (1996), pp. 67-90; Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996); Robert Kane, ‘On Free Will, Responsibility and Indeterminism’,
Philosophical Explorations 2 (1999), pp. 105-121; Robert Kane, ‘Agency, Responsibility, and
Indeterminism: Reflections on Libertarian Theories of Free Will’, in Freedom and Determinism, edited
by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and David Shier (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2004), pp. 70–88; Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas.
7 Recently experimental philosophers have attempted to gather experimental data about how we
utilize our concepts of free will and moral responsibility. In Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris,
Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner, ’Surveying Freedom Folk Intuitions about Free Will and
Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Psychology 18:5 (2005), pp. 561-584, Nahmias et al. purport to
show that we have compatibilist intuitions. In Shawn Nichols and Joshua Knobe, ‘Moral
Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions’, Nous 41 (2007), pp. 663685, Nichols and Knobe offer a definitive criticism of Nahmias et al., showing that we have largely
3
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which we come to form our beliefs and practices are veridical and capture relevant truths
about the world. Compatibilists and incompatibilists alike employ this method to
construct and defend theories of free will and moral responsibility; each argues that their
theories are as consistent, or more consistent, with our application of the concepts than
competing theories.
In this article I argue that compatibilists cannot justify employing this method to
defend their account of free will and moral responsibility. I argue that our concepts of
free will and moral responsibility are founded on our experiences of apparent liberty experiences like Susan’s apparent ability to choose either to take a cookie or refrain from
taking a cookie - and thus are inexorably tied to these experiences. These experiences are
the experiences in which compatibilist and incompatibilist alike are inclined to say that
the agent is both free and morally responsible in the relevant senses. If one argues, as the
compatibilist does, that these experiences fail to accurately describe the world, then one
has no reason to think that the concepts of free will and moral responsibility are
applicable to the actual world. Instead, the would-be compatibilist has every reason to
believe that our application of these concepts is erroneous, merely the result illusory
experiences.8
This article is divided into two sections. In the first, I argue that our beliefs about
free will and moral responsibility, and the applications of these concepts, are based upon
our near constant stream of experiences of apparent liberty. As a libertarian, I believe that
these experiences accurately reflect the world, however defending the veridicality of
these experiences is outside the scope of this work. In the second, I consider several
compatibilist responses, and argue that they fail to justify their appeal to our beliefs and
practices about free will and moral responsibility.

Free Will as Apparent Liberty
In ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’, Galen Strawson describes an example of
the kind of experience that he contends serves as the foundation for our beliefs about
moral responsibility:
Suppose you set off for a shop on the evening of a national holiday, intending to buy a cake
with your last ten pound note. On the steps of the shop someone is shaking an Oxfam tin.
You stop, and it seems completely clear to you that is it entirely up to you what you do next.
That is, it seems to you that you are truly, radically free to choose, in such a way that you
will be ultimately morally responsible for whatever you choose. Even if you believe that
determinism is true, and that you will in five minutes time be able to look back and say
what you did was determined, this does not seem to undermine your sense of the

incompatibilist intuitions, and that our compatibilist intuitions are restricted to emotional
judgments of moral responsibility of the kind that are subject to revision.
8 By the same reasoning, incompatibilist theories that deny our experiences of libertarian free will
accurately reflect the world cannot reasonably appeal to our moral beliefs derived from those
experiences. See Kane, Free Will and Values; Kane, ‘Two Kinds of Incompatibilism’; Kane, ‘Free Will:
The Elusive Ideal’; Kane, ‘Freedom, Responsibility, and Will-Setting’; Kane, The Significance of Free
Will; Kane, ‘On Free Will, Responsibility and Indeterminism’; Kane, ‘Agency, Responsibility, and
Indeterminism’; Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas.
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absoluteness and inescapability of your freedom, and of your moral responsibility for your
choice.9

Strawson’s description of this kind of experience is especially compelling in that he
focuses on our inability to interpret such experiences otherwise. This is to say that the
beliefs we form on the basis of this experience are not merely misapprehensions of the
experience that go away once we come to accept that universal causal determinism (or
something sufficiently like it) is true. Rather it seems as though in that moment even the
most stalwart and resolute of determinists cannot interpret their experiences as anything
but experiences of libertarian free will.
Strawson’s example focuses on a situation where we have a clear choice between
two mutually exclusive options, and reasons in favor of either option. However, it seems
uncontroversially true that we experience this kind of freedom in regards to the vast
majority of our choices, from deciding what clothes we wear, to the food we eat, to the
route we take to work. These experiences of apparent liberty are almost unrelenting, and
in each situation where we have such experiences, we believe we act freely. Furthermore,
the concept of free will seems to be inexorably tied to these experiences; in hypothetical
scenarios where we stipulate that, contrary to our understanding of events, our
experiences fail to accurately represent our decision making process, we tend to retract
our belief that we had free will. Consider the following case:
Black wants Jones to steal Ann’s car, and implants him with a device. If Jones is
going to choose to steal the car on his own, the device does nothing. Otherwise,
the device does two things – it (a) causally determines Jones to steal Ann’s car, and
(b) forces Jones to have the false experience of believing he can do otherwise
despite being wholly causally determined to steal the car by the device. As it so
happens, the device activates, Jones steals the car and experiences a false sensation
of liberty.10
Although Jones cannot help but believe that he exercises his free will when he choses to
steal Ann’s car, it is uncontroversially true that he did not do so. If Jones were to learn of
the device, he’d abandon his belief that he had exercised his free will.
Just as the concept of free will is tied to our experiences of liberty, so too is the
concept of moral responsibility. Galen Strawson says our experiences of liberty ‘are the
experiential rock on which the belief in true moral responsibility is founded’.11 Strawson

G. Strawson, p. 10.
This case is a variant on Harry Frankfurt’s infamous purported counterexample to the principle
of alternate possibilities (Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’), based on a
version constructed by Alfred Mele and David Robb (‘Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases’, Philosophical
Review 107:1 (1998), pp. 97-112). Frankfurt admits that in his famous case, Jones has alternate
possibilities (Frankfurt, ‘Some Thoughts Concerning PAP’); he can either do as Black secretly wants
him to of his own accord, or be wholly causally determined to do so by Black’s device. This is to
say that he can do one of two things. Frankfurt’s contention is that the alternate possibilities play no
role in determining Jones’ responsibility… but none the less, they appear to be a necessary, but not
sufficient condition for us to find Jones morally responsible.
11 G. Strawson, p. 11.
9

10
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claims that to be truly morally responsible for something is for it to ‘make sense’ for one to be
rewarded in heaven or punished in hell for that something; he goes on to say
The stress on the words ‘makes sense’ is important, for one certainly does not have to
believe in any version of the story of heaven and hell in order to understand the notion of
true moral responsibility that it is being used to illustrate.12

That so many people do believe in this story, or at least find it compelling, does, however,
count as evidence that Strawson’s account of true moral responsibility is an accurate theory
of the concept of moral responsibility.
The reason why it makes sense to hold us morally responsible for our actions, if
our experiences are correct, is because we believe that we are non-arbitrary, competent,
indeterministic sources of our actions. This is to say that we believe we can act for
reasons and that we have a reasonable idea about the consequences of our actions, all else
being equal. Thus, all else being equal, the bad consequences of someone’s actions are
evidence that person intended to bring about those bad consequences. To freely intend to
bring about bad consequences when you can easily avoid doing so is inherently
blameworthy, and thus it makes sense to hold such a person morally blameworthy for
her actions. Similarly, anyone who freely intends to bring about good consequences is
prima facie praiseworthy.
This brings us to what Strawson calls ‘The basic argument’; Strawson believes
this argument precludes the possibility that anyone could ever be truly morally
responsible for their actions. The argument goes like this:
(1) Nothing can be a causa sui – nothing can be a cause of itself.
(2) In order to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions one would have to be
causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects.
(3) Therefore nothing can be truly morally responsible.13
The problem with the basic argument is that our experience of liberty is not one of being
a causa sui; we do not believe that we cause ourselves.14 Rather we believe that we are the
authors and causes of our choices. The objection here is that nothing can cause itself to
act; but true moral responsibility doesn’t require this either. Our choices are often
explicitly prompted by external circumstances, but we believe other experiences might
just as well constitute inexplicit prompts. In Strawson’s case, our (mechanistic)
perception of the shaking of the Oxfam tin prompts us to act; however if our experience
is to be believed, this prompt in no way determines what our choice will be.
The prompt thesis maintains that although moral agents are the enduring, nonarbitrary causes of their actions, every choice they make needs to be prompted by some
experiential stimulus, internal or external. Stimuli may range from brain events to

G. Strawson, pp. 9-10.
Ibid., p. 5.
14 My criticism here of the basic argument is not meant to be a defense of libertarianism - such a
defense is outside the scope of this paper; rather it is a clarification of the kind of causation required
for our experiences of apparent liberty to be true. Free will doesn't require us to be our own
grandparents, it requires us to be free to respond to moral challenges.
12
13
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thoughts to sensory experiences to even our experience of time passing. Stimuli can be
deterministic or indeterministic in nature.
One objection to the prompt thesis is that it is prima facie inconsistent with some
of our experiences that we describe as spontaneous. However, upon reflection, this
doesn’t seem to be the case. For example, upon hearing the shaking of the Oxfam tin, we
are presented by our understanding of the situation with certain obvious options – we
can (a) buy a cake, or (b) give our money to the Oxfam tin shaker. However, all else being
equal, we are equally free to (c) buy cake for the less fortunate, (d) go home, and so on.
These options are less obvious, less attentive to the scenario, but no less within our power
– or at least so we believe. Our choices are, at least in part, limited by our imagination in
the same way they are limited by other circumstances. We cannot freely choose to do
things that we don’t think of, or that we don’t think are possible. A prisoner cannot freely
choose to turn into a bird and fly out the window, although he may be free to try.
Much as we believe we are free to go ‘off script’ in the Oxfam tin scenario, we
may be equally free to act spontaneously towards any number of mundane prompts,
such as our experience of the passage of time. Unlike the Oxfam tin scenario, our
experience of the passage of time doesn’t demand a response of any particular kind, and
as such any response to this prompt will feel spontaneous and unplanned despite being
prompted.
David Hume famously criticized libertarian free will as being undesirable
because it is a liberty of indifference, where our actions are made arbitrarily, by chance.15
But this is not how we experience our choices; we feel as if we can act for reasons without
being casually determined by them. After choosing to donate his last ten pound note to
the Oxfam tin shaker, a determinist may be able to look back and convince herself that
she was causally determined to do so by her empathy; but had she chosen, instead, to
buy the cake, she may just as easily convince herself that she was causally determined to
do so by her desire to eat cake. Intuitively, though, we find both reasons prima facie
compelling and cannot help but believe – at the time – that we could act on either set of
reasons, and that to do so wouldn’t be arbitrary. This is not an experience of indifference.
Critics of libertarianism, justifiably, argue that such an experience is incoherent.
For any choice, either we do so for reasons or we do not. If we do not, they are arbitrary.
We claim that we experience the capacity to choose between sets of reasons nonarbitrarily, but to do so would mean that we have a separate reason to justify our
choosing one set of reasons over the other. Choosing to act on that reason over competing
reasons, too, is either arbitrary, or it is not. Either (a) it’s reasons all the way down, such
that we get an infinite regress, (b) there is one or more self-justifying reasons somewhere
down the line, which suggests determinism, or (c) at some point our choice between
reasons is arbitrary. This is a rather convincing argument against the veridicality of our
experience of liberty, but all the worse for any compatibilist hoping to save the concepts
of free will and moral responsibility from the chopping block.
As a libertarian I feel obliged to offer a quick response to this criticism. Much as
we draw a distinction between deterministic events and indeterministic events, we draw
a distinction between arbitrary events and non-arbitrary events. Almost everyone
believes that deterministic events can be either arbitrary or non-arbitrary, yet the criticism
above turns on indeterministic events being solely arbitrary. But almost everyone

15

Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature; Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.
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believes this is false; we all seem to accept the possibility of non-arbitrary indeterministic
events. For example, if there was indeterminacy in the buckshot pattern from a shotgun,
the pattern wouldn’t necessarily be arbitrary – if the shotgun was successfully aimed at
an intruder, much of the buckshot would find its way to the intruder, and there’s a rather
specific reason it would do so – because the gun was aimed at him. Thus, the above
criticism is less convincing than we might initially think; our experience of apparently
non-arbitrary indeterminism is not incoherent.16
In the same way that we experience apparent liberty, sometimes we also
experience apparent determinism, in which our actions are uncontroversially said to be
wholly causally determined by instinct or character. In the case of instinct, it doesn’t
make sense to hold us morally responsible since it is outside of our control. Similarly,
when the character that determined us to act is the result of factors outside of our control,
we don’t think we’re responsible or our actions; although we may still lament our having
such a bad character, and attempt to change it. Indeed, we believe that we have some
control over our character traits, such that we can train ourselves to either gain or lose
certain traits. If these beliefs are correct, it makes sense to hold us derivatively morally
responsible for actions causally determined by freely acquired character traits because we
are truly morally responsible for the free actions which brought about those traits and
had a good idea what kind of actions those traits would bring about. To be derivatively
morally responsible for x is to be truly morally responsible for y, where y plays a relevant
causal role in bringing about x. According to this framework, we are truly morally
responsible for our free actions, and derivatively morally responsible for the
consequences that follow.
In this section I’ve argued that our experience of apparent liberty leads us to
believe that we have non-arbitrary, competent, undetermined control over many of our
actions such that it makes sense to hold us truly morally responsible for them – to punish
us for the harms we freely bring about, and praise us for the good we freely bring about
because it’s ultimately up to us what we do when we act freely.
Note that the concept of true moral responsibility discussed here is distinct from
many other common concepts that may play a similar role in our lives; concepts like legal
responsibility, causal responsibility, and what I call practical responsibility, the feature of it
being practical to treat something in a similar way to how one might treat something that
is morally responsible. Consider the following case:
Mary has contracted a highly contagious and dangerous disease through no fault
of her own. Fortunately for her, she is merely a carrier and shows no symptoms,
although she can still spread it to others.
I think most of us would agree that Mary has a strong moral obligation not to infect
others, and to quarantine herself if possible. However, it is practical to not give her the
option – after all, she might choose otherwise. Suppose the Center for Disease Control
were to swoop in, abduct Mary, and quarantine her until a cure could be discovered. It is
practical to treat Mary in this way, but it is uncontroversially true that she doesn’t
deserve it. This practicality, or practical responsibility, bears little similarity to the other

It’s not clear that this kind of non-arbitrary indeterminism would be sufficient for the purposes of
true moral responsibility; but this question is outside the scope of this work.

16
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concepts because it’s responsibility in name only – Mary is, by stipulation, neither
morally or legally responsible for her coming down with the disease, and she may not
even be causally responsible in any relevant sense either. Yet it makes sense to treat Mary
in a similar way to how we would treat Mary if she was a morally or legally responsible
for her being a threat to others - doing so saves lives.
If our concepts of free will and moral responsibility are inexorably tied to
instances where we experience apparent liberty, and compatibilists reject the veridicality
of these experiences, then our employment of the concepts in actual and hypothetical
situations cannot be used as evidence towards the truth of compatibilist theories of the
concepts. Indeed, it’s not at all clear what could count as support for a compatibilist
theory of these concepts. Fortunately, determinists are already willing to reject the
veridicality of a large number of our experience and the beliefs founded on them, so
abandoning the concepts of free will and moral responsibility as equally illusory
probably wouldn’t force them to embrace a far more radical skepticism - but it would
cause them to abandon compatibilism.

Compatibilist Avenues of Response
Thus far, I’ve argued that the concepts of free will and moral responsibility are
inexorably tied to experiences that determinists believe fail to accurately reflect the
world, and that to abandon the veridicality of our experiences undermines the only
reason we have to assume the veridicality of our application of these concepts. I contend
this leaves the compatibilist with no means to justify a compatibilist theory of either free
will or moral responsibility, and thus compatibilism is incoherent.
In this section I discuss four potential responses to my argument: (1) the other
methods approach, (2) an appeal to those lacking experiences of apparent liberty, (3) the
alternate foundation approach, and (4) an appeal to counterexamples.
(1) Other Methods
Although the primary way analytic philosophers investigate concepts is to analyze the
employment of the concepts, it is not the only way. For example, they might look to a
theory’s consistency with other beliefs, or its ontological simplicity as evidence of its
accuracy. A diligent compatibilist, then, might deny the veridicality of our application of
the concepts of free will and moral responsibility, and yet still have a means to construct
a robust theory about those concepts.
Of the four responses I look at, I believe this is the most compelling.
Unfortunately, it is uncontroversially true that most of the leading compatibilists simply
fail to pursue this method, and instead argue from the position that their account of the
concepts is consistent with our commonsense application of the concepts.17 It’s also not

See Fischer, ‘Responsibility and Control’; Fischer, ‘As Go the Frankfurt Examples, so Goes
Deontic Morality’; Fischer, ‘The Importance of Frankfurt-Style Argument’; Fischer, ‘The Frankfurt
Cases’; Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’; Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will
and the Concept of a Person’; Frankfurt, ‘Some Thoughts Concerning PAP’; Hunt, ‘Moral
Responsibility and Unavoidable Action’; Hunt, ‘Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives’; P.
F. Strawson.
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clear that the remaining methods open to the compatibilist are sufficient to produce a
robust theory of these concepts. Even assuming a robust theory of either free will or
moral responsibility could be constructed in this way, these compatibilists still have to
argue that their theory is preferable to that of libertarian free will and true moral
responsibility.
Incompatibilists who believe in the truth of universal causal determinism can
argue that because our experience of free will is illusory, our application of these
concepts is irrelevant; for them our application of these concepts to the actual world is
consistent, but founded on a mistake that their compatibilist rivals already accept.
Furthermore, if Galen Strawson is right, they’re both better off being hard incompatibilists,
believing that these concepts are incompatible with the truth of either determinism or
indeterminism.
(2) Lack of Experiences of Apparent Liberty
Suppose that some people honestly report that they do not experience a sensation of
liberty of the kind Galen Strawson discusses. If this is true, these people’s concepts of free
will and moral responsibility must be derived from something other than their personal
experience of liberty. If their actual and hypothetical employment of the concepts is
similar to ours, then compatibilists can argue that our concepts of free will and moral
responsibility do not rely upon an experience of liberty, and thus that the primary
method is sufficient for testing compatibilist theories of these concepts.
There are a number of problems with this response. First, it’s not clear that such
people exist. Second, if these people regularly interact with those of us who do have
experiences of apparent liberty, it’s possible that they get their concepts from us, and thus
their concepts can still be based on experiences of apparent liberty. If we find a secluded
group of human beings who report not to have the same experience of liberty as we do,
and yet still employ concepts that had the same actual and hypothetical application as
our concepts of free will and moral responsibility, then we will succeed in showing that
these concepts can grounded in something other than our experience of apparent liberty.
However, I strongly suspect that if we found such a group, they would lack any concept
of free will and moral responsibility; although they might get along just as well by
employing adjacent concepts like freedom from coercion and legal responsibility.
(3) Alternate Foundation
Alternatively, compatibilists might get just as far if they can offer an alternate foundation
for our beliefs about free will and moral responsibility that is as consistent with our
application of the concepts. Such an approach could only be a success if it could ground
moral responsibility and free will in something other than our experience of liberty while
still keeping these concepts distinct from adjacent concepts.
One of the reasons that our experiences serve as an adequate foundation for our
concepts of free will and moral responsibility is that they are nearly inescapable; we
almost constantly feel as though we have the authorial control Galen Strawson describes,
and we cannot help but feel responsible for our choices in such situations. If
compatibilists can find an alternate foundation, ideally it will be as common and
inescapable as these experiences are. This is one of the virtues of P. F. Strawson’s theory
of moral responsibility. P. F. Strawson claimed that rather than people being genuinely
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morally responsible for their actions, the practice of holding people moral responsible
played a central role in their personal relationships.18 Because personal relationships play
a fairly large role in our lives, they are a good potential foundation for the concept of
moral responsibility. On his view, our concept of holding people moral responsibility
plays a regulatory role in such relationships, and can be derived from truths about such
relationships. Setting aside the view’s prima facie inconsistencies with our linguistic
practices, it’s not at all clear P. F. Strawson’s account of moral responsibility is anything
but a kind of practical responsibility concerned with relationship maintenance. This is
inherently inconsistent with our intuitions and hypothetical employment of the concept,
such as the ones consistent with the story of heaven and hell and our intuitions about
Mary. This inconsistency shouldn’t be surprising - practical responsibility is nothing like
moral responsibility. While holding people morally responsible is often practical, it is not
necessarily so, and vice versa.
The central problem with this approach is that a satisfactory foundation should
be both immediately apparent and capture those aspects of our actual and hypothetical
practices concerning free will and moral responsibility that distinguish them from
adjacent concepts. Thus far compatibilist attempts to offer an alternate foundation have
met with much the same problem as P. F. Strawson’s attempt, they fail to accurately
explain our application of the concepts without appealing to what they believe is a false
experience of liberty that would undermine the value of the compatibilist’s theory’s
consistency with the application of the concepts.
(4) Appeal to Counterexamples
The compatibilist has one final option, I think, to defend her appeal to our application of
the concepts of free will and moral responsibility. Unable to construct a theory of these
concepts by way of other means, unable to find examples of people who apply the
concepts in the same way as we do despite not having any contact with an experience of
apparent liberty, and unable to offer an alternative foundation for our application of the
concepts, the compatibilist might be able to construct a counterexample to my claim that
our concepts are founded on our experience of apparent liberty.19 If the compatibilist can
do so, they can argue that our experience of apparent liberty is no better a foundation for
our concepts than alternative compatibilist foundations, and thus the concepts are, once
again, up for grabs.
Daniel Dennett cites such an apparent case, the story of Martin Luther who, when
pressured to recant his writings, refused and is often quoted as saying that he ‘could do
no other’.20 Luther is prima facie morally responsible for his actions, but if we take his
purported description of events literally, he lacked the experience of feeling as though he
could do otherwise.

P. F. Strawson.
Many compatibilists already construct cases where someone is said to be prima facie morally
responsible despite being wholly causally determined or lacking alternate possibilities. For
instance, see Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’; Frankfurt, ‘Some
Thoughts Concerning PAP’; Fischer, ‘Responsibility and Control’; Fischer, ‘As Go the Frankfurt
Examples, so Goes Deontic Morality’; Fischer, ‘The Frankfurt Cases’; and Hunt, ‘Moral
Responsibility and Unavoidable Action’; Hunt, ‘Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives’.
20 Martin Luther, quoted in Dennett, p. 133.
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I cannot purport to know how Luther felt; but I do know that we often make
similar statements about our own actions, despite their being accompanied by an
experience of apparent liberty. For example, when the right thing to do is obvious, it
makes sense to say ‘I wouldn’t do otherwise’ or ‘I couldn’t do otherwise.’ Although the
latter might be, strictly speaking, false, both serve to convey my dedication to doing
what’s right and to reassure my audience that they don’t need to worry about me doing
the wrong thing.21
However, if we take this quote literally, it would be quite odd to say that he was,
in fact, praiseworthy for his actions. Even though he did the prima facie right thing, it’s not
at all clear that it would make sense to reward Luther with an eternity in heaven for
something that was outside of his control. Of course, independent of questions of
Luther’s moral responsibility, it is practical to hold him up as an example of how one
should behave when confronted with adversity - and this is true whether his actions were
his own, or caused by divine intervention.
I discuss this approach last because I believe it is the least attractive option the
compatibilist has. I’ve argued that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility are
inexorably tied to our experiences of apparent liberty; but if determinist compatibilists
are in doubt about this claim, they cannot deny that these same experiences generate
beliefs about our capacities that, qua determinists, they believe to be false. The
determinist accepts that there can be massive error not only in our experiences, but in our
belief sets as well. If our beliefs are so untrustworthy with regard to our capabilities, it
would be quite odd if compatibilists were willing to balance the acceptability of pursuing
compatibilism on the veridicality of rare experiences like that of Martin Luther’s.

Summary
Compatibilists believe that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with our
being wholly causally determined to act by circumstances outside of our control.
Invariably, compatibilists appeal to their theories’ compatibility with our application of
these concepts to actual and hypothetical situations. However it seems as though our
experience of liberty is inescapable, such that even the most dedicated determinist cannot
help but feel as if they are capable of acting other than they actually do, and being truly
morally responsible such that it is appropriate to hold them morally responsible for their
actions even when there is no practical benefit to doing so. I contend that this experience
of apparent liberty is the foundation of our concepts of free will and moral responsibility.
Both compatibilist and incompatibilist alike are apt to say that when we experience such
apparent liberty, we are likely both acting free and morally responsible for our actions. If
this is the case, when compatibilists reject the veridicality of such experiences, they
undermine the only reason they have to believe the concepts of free will and moral

Frankfurt discusses how we sometimes say that we can’t do otherwise when we’re faced with a
coercive threat (Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’). Frankfurt believes
that genuine coercion requires one to lack freedom of the will and be forced to act by the coercive
threat, but coerced agents rarely report a genuine lack of the experience of liberty; rather the threat
is so coercive that they have prima facie strong reasons to act as the coercer intends them to.
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responsibility are applicable to the actual world. As a result, determinist compatibilist
theories of free will and moral responsibility are incoherent.

William Simkulet, University of Wisconsin Marshfield/Wood County
simkuletwm@yahoo.com

Bibliography
Dennett, Daniel. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press, 1984.
Fischer, John Martin. ‘Responsibility and Control’, Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), pp. 2440.
Fischer, John Martin. ‘As Go the Frankfurt Examples, so Goes Deontic Morality’, Journal
of Ethics 4 (2000), pp. 361-363.
Fischer, John Martin. ‘The Importance of Frankfurt-Style Argument’, Philosophical
Quarterly 57 (2007), pp. 464-471.
Fischer, John Martin, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Four Views on
Free Will. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.
Fischer, John Martin. ‘The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories’, Philosophical Review
119 (2010), pp. 315-336.
Frankfurt, Harry G. 1969, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,’ Journal of
Philosophy 66:23 (1969), pp. 829-839.
Frankfurt, Harry G. ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of
Philosophy 68 (1971), pp. 5-20.
Frankfurt, Harry G. ‘Some Thoughts Concerning PAP’, in Moral Responsibility and
Alternative Possibilities. Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, edited by
David Widerker and Michael McKenna. Aldershot: Ashgate, [2003] 2006, pp. 339-345.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edition,
revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1739-1740] 1975a.
Hume, David. Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd
edition, revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1751] 1975b.
Hunt, David. ‘Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action’, Philosophical Studies 97
(2000), pp. 195–227.
Hunt, David. ‘Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives’, Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 29 (2005), pp. 126–145.
Kane, Robert. Free Will and Values. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985.
Kane, Robert. ‘Two Kinds of Incompatibilism.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50
(1989), pp. 219-254.
Kane, Robert. ‘Free Will: The Elusive Ideal’, Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 25-60.
Kane, Robert. ‘Freedom, Responsibility, and Will-Setting’, Philosophical Topics 24:2 (1996),
pp. 67-90.
Kane, Robert. The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Kane, Robert. ‘On Free Will, Responsibility and Indeterminism’, Philosophical Explorations
2 (1999), pp. 105-121.

17

De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 1:3 (2014)

Kane, Robert. ‘Agency, Responsibility, and Indeterminism: Reflections on Libertarian
Theories of Free Will’, in Freedom and Determinism, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell,
Michael O'Rourke, and David Shier. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004, pp. 70–88.
Pereboom, Derk. ‘Defending Hard Incompatibilism’, Midwest Studies 29 (2005), pp. 228247.
Pereboom, Derk. ‘Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again‘, in Essays on Free Will and
Moral Responsibility, edited by Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen. Newcastle-uponTyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2008, pp. 1-33.
Mele, Alfred R. and David Robb. ‘Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases’, Philosophical Review
107:1 (1998), pp. 97-112.
Nahmias, Eddy, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Turner. ‘Surveying Freedom
Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Psychology 18:5
(2005), pp. 561-584.
Nichols, Shawn, and Joshua Knobe. ‘Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The
Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions’, Nous 41 (2007), pp. 663-685.
Simkulet, William. ‘On Moral Enhancement’, American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3:4
(2012), pp. 17-18.
Simkulet, William. ‘In Control’, Philosophical Inquires 2:1 (2014), pp. 59-75.
Strawson, Galen. ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies 75
(1994), pp. 5-24.
Strawson, Peter F. ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of the British Academy XLVIII
(1962), pp. 1-25.

Publication made possible by generous support from the Swedish Research Council.

18

